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In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 1
individuals convicted of criminal offenses in state courts have had to
seek relief other than habeas corpus when trying to vindicate alleged
violations of the fourth amendment prohibition against illegal searches
and seizures. One possible remedy is a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against the individual policemen accused
of the wrong-doing. 2 The issue faced by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in McCurry v. Allen 3 was whether collateral estoppel
barred the relitigation of the legality of a search and seizure in a
section 1983 damage action brought by a state prisoner denied access
to federal habeas corpus by the Stone decision.
On April 9, 1977 the St. Louis Police Department received a tip
that Willie McCurry was currently involved in selling heroin. 4 Six
or seven undercover police officers were dispatched to McCurry's
house, two of whom went to the door to attempt to make a purchase,
while the others hid in nearby bushes. 5 The officers knocked at the
door and when McCurry appeared they asked if thex, could buy some
"caps". 6 McCurry asked the officers to wait, re-entered the house
and returned shooting, seriously injuring the two officers at the
door. 7 A gun battle ensued between the suspect and the remaining
8
officers who were quickly reinforced by thirty additional officers.
1 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court held that where the state has provided a defendant with
a full and fair opportunity to present his search and seizure claim, the Constitution does not
require that he be allowed to raise it again at a habeas corpus hearing. Id. at 496.
2 Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, an' citizen to
the United States or anv other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured bv the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party, injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) found that section 1983 gave a civil cause of action
against municipal police for their unconstitutional acts.
3 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
4 Id. at 796.
5 Id.
6 1I. "Caps" is a slang term for heroin capsules. Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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After being told by the police that if he came out of the house " 'no
action would be taken,' "9 McCurry surrendered. 10 Suspecting that
others might still be inside, the police entered and searched the
house, finding heroin. "
Prior to trial, McCurry moved to have the evidence found in the
house suppressed. 12 The motion was partially granted, allowing only
the introduction of the evidence found in plain sight. 13 At the trial,
McCurry was found guilty of illegal possession of heroin as well as
two counts of assault with intent to kill with malice -aforethought. 14
Following his conviction, McCurry, in July, 1978, filed a
$1,000,000 damage suit against individual officers of the St. Louis
Police Department. 15 The complaint alleged that the officers conspired to conduct an illegal search of McCurry's home, that the officers did in fact conduct an illegal search of his home, and, finally,
that they assaulted him during his arrest. 16 In a memorandum decision, 17 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 18 The court
stated that the sole issue in the section 1983 suit, the constitutionality
of the search and seizure, had been fully litigated on the merits and
adversely determined to plaintiff's position-thereby collaterally estopping the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent civil action. 19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
and remanded holding that "it is our duty to consider fully unencumbered by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appellant's § 1983
claims. '"20 In a brief analysis, the court of appeals stressed the importance of providing a federal forum to hear the claims of state prisoners denied the availability of habeas corpus under Stone. 21 Judge
McMillan, writing for a unanimous panel, acknowledged that other
federal circuits and numerous district courts had applied collateral es-

9 Id. The police communicated with \lcCurrN by using a bullhorn. Id.
10 Id.

11 Id.
12 1&d
13 Id. The heroin which the police found hidden among tires was excluded. Id.
14 Id. at
15 Id.
16 Ild.
17 Id.
1I Id. at
19 Id. at
20 Id. at

797.

796.
797.

799. The court also held that the appellant was required to exhaust his state rem-

edies before proceeding with the rehearing. Id. This issue is discussed at notes 99-104 infra and
accompanying text.
21 Id.
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toppel to section 1983 actions when the issues raised in those actions
were adversely determined to the federal plaintiff in prior state criminal trials. 22 Specifically, the court noted, collateral estoppel had
barred post-conviction section 1983 actions claiming search and seizure violations in two federal appellate decisions prior to Stone. 23
The McCurry opinion observed, however, that a number of the
courts that had applied collateral estoppel to section 1983 suits "expressly based their holding on the fact that federal habeas corpus relief, and thus a federal forum, was then available- to defendants seeking review of their state court conviction. 24 Relying on Alitchtum v.
Foster,25 a case in which the Supreme Court interpreted section 1983
as granting broad power to federal courts, 26 the court claimed that it
was duty bound to compensate for appellant's loss of habeas corpus
review by permitting his section 1983 action despite Stolle's endorsement of the competency of state judges to pass on constitutional
claims. 27 The court buttressed its analysis with an expansive interpretation of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Stonle from
which the eighth circuit concluded that the denial of habeas corpus
review in search and seizure cases was premised, in part, on the
availability of other remedies. 28 McCurry found section 1983 to
be such a remedy.
In order to full\, understand the impact of this case, it is necessan, to examine the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the subsequent case
law up to the McCurry decision. The Act of 1871, 29 which included
what is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was enacted to overcome
the influence of the Ku Klux Klan on the administration of justice in
the Reconstruction South.30 Congress feared that Southern courts
had "one form of justice for Unionists and blacks and another form of
justice for the Ku Klux Klan and its sym pathizers. "31 The clear pUr-

22 Id. at 797-98.
23 Id. at 798.
21 Id. See notes 51-58 infra and accompanying text.
25 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
26 Id. at 242.
27 NlcCuirry, 606 F.2d at 799.
28 Id. at 7.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
20 Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 N\.
L. RE.. 859, 866 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Theis]. The legislative histor, of the post Civil War
civil rights acts is recounted in Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas CorprusJurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965) and Aims, The Kt Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light
on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 Sr. Louis U. L. J. 331 (1967).
1l Theis, stipria
note 30. at 866-67 (footnote omitted).
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pose of the Act was to provide a federal forum for the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights. 32 Although the specific conditions in
the Reconstruction Era which precipitated passage of the Act have
significantly changed,33 section 1983 still provides a means for redressing violations of federal rights committed under color of state law. 34
Despite the fact that the legislative history of the Act is without reference to res judicata or collateral estoppel, 35 one commentator has
contended that an expansive application of preclusion principles
would not comport with the congressional intent of section 1983.36
Federal courts have nonetheless applied collateral estoppel to civil
rights cases with "substantial unanimity,"3 7 even when the prior
judgment is a state criminal conviction. 38 The argument in favor of
applying preclusion principles to post-conviction section 1983 actions

32 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). That case involved a section 1983 damage action

against thirteen Chicago police officers alleging an illegal search and seizure. The Supreme
Court held that the federal remedy was supplementary to any state remedy which need not be
invoked prior t() seeking relief under section 1983. See also Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Va. 1973).
3 Theis, supra note 30, at 869.
34 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 156 (1961).
3, Theis, supra note 30, at 866. Nor is it likely that the drafters of the Act could have
foreseen the recent liberalization in the application of collateral estoppel. Developments in the
Laie: § 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1139 n.39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Developments ].
36 Theis, supra note 30, at 866.
Briefly, collateral estuppel or issue preclusion bars a party from relitigatig a fact or issue
that has been actually litigated and determined in a prior action. Application of the doctrine
gives finality to judgments and thus conserves scarce judicial resources. Finally, and most importantly with respect to the issue discussed herein, collateral estoppel promotes the interest of
comity between federal and state courts. F. JAMNES,CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.18-11.22 (1965).
The officers, sued in their individual capacity for alleged violations of constitutional rights,
are not barred by requireisents of mutuality from defensively pleading collateral estoppel in a
section 1983 suit. The officers are considered part of the prosecution in the preceding state trial.
Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also, Comment, Collateral Estoppel Fffects of State (riminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 95, 96
[hereinafter cited as ILL. Comment].
Federal courts are required to give preclusive effect to state court judgments by statute. 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1977). Frequently, courts ignore the statute and refer "to a general federal law
of res judicata." Developuentts, supra note 35, at 1334. Whenever collateral estoppel is discussed in the text or footnotes of this note it is meant to include reference to section 1738 also.
" Rimimer v. Favetteville Police Department, 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1978). See, e.g.,
Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975).
Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (E.D. Va. 1973) and cases cited therein.
3 Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 989
(1975). The test used to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel in subsequent civil
trials is whether the question " 'was distinctly put in issue and directly determined' in the
criminal conviction . . . issues which were essential to the verdict must be regarded as having
been determined by the judgment.- Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S.
558, 569 (1951).
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was presented in the leading case of Palma v. Powers. 39 The district
court stated that unless mandated by public policy "there is no reason
why a litigant . . . given a full and fair opportunity to present his case
. . . should be allowed to relitigate [it] . . . in another court." 40 A
second action in federal court was perceived as a waste of judicial
resources, a potential cause of friction between federal and state
courts, and as undermining society's interest in the finality of judg42
ments.41 Federal courts have also relied on the "plain language"
of the Supreme Court in Preiser v. Rodriquez 43 that "res judicata has
been held to be fully applicable to a[n] . . . action brought under
section 1983."44

With the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Potwell, 4 5 the
general applicability of preclusion principles to all civil rights cases
must be questioned. Stone held that "where the state has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,
a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search
or seizure was introduced at his trial." 46 The Court found that the
marginal contribution to deterring police violations gained by applying the exclusionary rule in habeas corpus actions was significantly
outweighed by the societal costs incurred in the rule's use which
"persist with special force" in collateral actions. 4 7 The Court
listed
these costs as deflecting the courts from the truth-finding process,
48
freeing the guilty, and fostering disrespect for the judicial svstem.
Fourth amendment claims are not concerned with the convict's guilt

39 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. I11. 1969) (collateral estoppel bars relitigation of legality of search
and seizure in section 1983 action even though the issue was not argued at the criminal trial
resulting in conviction). See also Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd el

banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). But see
Nev v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971) (res judicata would render section 1983 a "dead
letter").
40 Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 932 (N.D. I11. 1969).
41 Id. at 937-38.
42 Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). The -plainness" of the Court's language has been criticized for being indefinite, thus leading to inconsistent results in the lower
courts. Theis, supra note 30, at 865.
43 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (Supreme Court rejected state prisoner's section 1983 suit to recover
good time" credit stating that proper action was habeas corpus in dicta Court stated that
normal rules of preclusion would apply to section 1983).
44 Id. at 497.
45 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
46 Id. at 494.
47 Id. at 495.
48 Id. at 490-91.
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or innocence and therefore do not justify the burdens placed upon
the judicial system in habeas corpus cases. 4 9 Furthermore, the
Stone Court embraced the idea of parity between federal and state
courts in determining questions of constitutional law. 50
As noted in the McCurriy opinion, 51 the problem created for a
state prisoner by a lack of habeas corpus review on the one hand, and
the application of collateral estoppel to section 1983 suits on the
other, has been recognized in dicta by a number of federal courts
before and after Stone.52 Providing a conceptual nexus for this dilemma is Rimnner v. Fatetteville Police Department,5 a post-Stone
decision in which a state prisoner was collaterally estopped from
litigating a section 1983 damage suit alleging a violation of his sixth
amendment right of confrontation. 4 While acknowledging that collateral estoppel was generally applicable to a post-conviction section
1983 action when, as there, the state prisoner had a federal forum
available to determine his constitutional claim, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated that Stone had generally removed the
possibility of habeas corpus relief in cases involving alleged search
and seizure violations. 5 The court went on to suggest that the application of issue preclusion to a section 1983 action "by reason of a
state court conviction in those cases .. . may deny a state court prisoner access to a federal forum entirely. "56 Such a result was seen by
that circuit to be at odds with the intent of' Congress in passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 7 Riminer, however, did not have to ad-

"

Id. at 491-92 n.31.
50 Id. at 493-94 n.35.
Si McCurrv, 606 F.2d at 798.
52 See, e.g.,Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977) (section
1983 suit for damages based on alleged unconstitutional confrontation barred by collateral estoppel after conviction); Thistlewaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) (section 1983 damage suit alleged violation of first amendment
rights barred after conviction for distributing anti-war literature in city parks without permit)
Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973) (section 1983 suit for damages alleging
illegal arrest barred by collateral estoppel after conviction). See aLso Meadows v. Evans, 529
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en bane, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 937-38 (N.D. I11.
1969).
53 567 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1977).
5 Id. at 274-75.
55 Id. at 276.
56 1d.

51 Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was generally intended to provide access to a federal
forum in civil rights cases. The court's contention was that whenever a state convict has been
denied access to habeas corpus and would be collaterally estopped in a section 1983 action
seeking redress of constitutional rights, the Act may justify an exception to the operation of
preclusion principles. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
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dress that issue. Such cases have done little more than note the problem and suggest that an exception may have to be made to the gen-

eral application of collateral estoppel for section 1983 suits filed as a
result of Stone. 58
In AlcCurry, the court of appeals recognized that the Supreme
Court was determined in Stone to limit the reach of the exclusionary
rule and the social costs occasioned by its use. 9 Consequently,
McCurry placed substantial weight on Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in that case, where he renewed his campaign to find alternatives to the exclusionary rule. 60 Burger argued that the flaws in the
rule and the costs of applying it have been amply demonstrated over
the course of its existence. 61 In its present "absolutist" application,
the exclusionary rule has been a disincentive to the legislative development of rational alternatives.62 "The time has come," he declared in Stone, to modify the reach of the exclusionary rule. 63
Based on the Burger concurrence, the McCurry Court Concluded
that the result reached in Stone was partially justified on the basis
that alternative remedies to habeas corpus for search and seizure violations, including section 1983 damage suits, were still available to
state prisoners. 64 The circuit's interpretation is not, however, fully
in accord with the Chief Justice's intent. In Stone he was concerned
with exhorting Congress and state legislatures to take action in fashioning alternatives to the exclusionary rule 6 5 rather than inviting a
judicial response to the problem. Burger concurred in Stone because
he viewed the result as an appropriate impetus to the desired legislative action. 66 Without being four square with the Chief Justice, the
McCurry decision is certainly within the spirit of the concurrence. By

58 The cursory language used in Riminer and the cases cited in note 52 supra undercut the

contention of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that these courts "expressly" applied
collateral estoppel because of the availability of habeas corpus to the plaintiff.
5' McCurry, 606 F.2d at 798.
60 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
Burger contended that the application of the exclusionary rule failed to adequately deter
police violations of the fourth amendment while allowing countless criminals to go free. This
monolithic" approach failed to distinguish de minimus, good faith encroachments of fourth
amendment rights resulting from the burdens of police work as opposed to flagrant and intentional violations. He asserted that society has the right to expect rational and graded responses
from the judiciary to fourth amendment violations. Id. at 416-19.
61 Stone, 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 496.
" McCurry, 606 F.2d at 798.
65 Stone, 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
66 Id.
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applying section 1983 the McCurry court has employed existing legislation to furnish a remedy for search and seizure violations. 67 It is a
remedy which, if not barred by collateral estoppel, is immediately
available for use as an alternative to the "Draconian [and] discredited" 68 exclusionary rule.
Still, the primary basis for the holding of the court of appeals was
its reliance on Mitchum v. Foster.69 Interpreting section 1983 in a
different context,70 the Supreme Court in Mitchuni described the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 as "an altering of the relationship between
the States and the nation with respect to the protection of federally
created rights."71 The result of that alteration was "the interposition
of the federal courts between the States and the people as guardians
of the People's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law."

72

Under this broad claim of

federal power the panel in McCurry believed it was compelled to
provide the appellant with a federal forum for his section 1983 claim
as a result of Stone. 73
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, Mitchum's value as
precedent for such broad federal power has been undercut 74 by the
expansion of the holding of Younger v. Harris7 5 -- "that principles of
federalism, comity and [economy] generally preclude federal equitable [intervention] into pending state" cases.76 As a result of these
policy considerations, an exception to the application of collateral estoppel for section 1983 actions filed as a result of Stone must rest on a
narrower justification which fits the special circumstances of such
cases.

Despite the tenuous nature of the circuit court's analysis, should
collateral estoppel bar post-conviction section 1983 damage actions
seeking redress of alleged search and seizure violations, McCurry and

67 See, e.g.,

California v. Ney, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).

" Stone, 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
69 407 U. S. 225 (1972).
'o The issue faced by the Court was whether section 1983 was an exception to the antiinjunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). Id.
71 407 U.S. at 242.
72 id.
71 McCurry, 606 F.2d at 799.
14 Developients, supra note 35, at 1335. Also, federal equitable intervention is less offensive to state judicial autonomy than intrusions into interests protected by preclusion principles.
.
75 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger requires that a party exhaust all state remedies available to
him before turning to the federal courts. Other cases in the Younger line are Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977) and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
76 Developments, supra note 35, at 1335-36.
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others like him may very well be left without a federal forum to hear
their fourth amendment claims. Before commencing an analysis of
whether an exception is possible, it is necessary to identify the competing interests in a post-conviction action of the type sought by the
appellant. On one side are the interests fostered by collateral
estoppel-economy, efficiency and comity, as well as the Stoie
Court's desire to limit the use of the exclusionary rule in collateral
actions. 77 Juxtaposed to those interests are the promises of a federal
forum embodied in section 1983 for the protection of federal rights
and the corollary federal interest in the consistent application of constitutional law. 78
While a full scale exception to the rules of preclusion for all section 1983 damage actions would greatly tax scarce judicial resources
and cause unnecessary friction between federal and state courts, 9 a
number of commentators have argued for exceptions in limited circumstances. 80 Based on those contentions, a strong argument can be
made for exempting post-conviction section 1983 damage actions for
redress of search and seizure violations from collateral estoppel when
habeas corpus is unavailable.
Two distinct approaches have been suggested. The first approach, which rejects the analogy between habeas corpus and section
1983, contends that allowing single issues of law and fact to be relitigated in a section 1983 action in federal court after a state court determination, is not as offensive to the values protected by the general
rules of preclusion as a de novo trial. 81 The federal interest in providing a choice of forum through section 1983 and in protecting civil
rights, however, remains constant whether the doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel are involved. 82 The state court convic-

"

See note 36 supra and accompanying text.

78 Developments, supra note 35, at 1339.

Throughout this discussion it must be remembered that the only other alternative to section 1983 for these convicts is direct appeal on writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme

Court. With the ever growing caseload, however, only a small percentage will have their search
and seizure claim heard in that Court. On the topic of the Court's caseload, see generally

Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Federal Judicial Center Report of the Study Group on the
Caseload of the Supreme Court (1972).
79 Develppinents, supra note 35, at 1336. See also Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REX'. 185 (1974).
80 See, e.g., Averitt, 44 U. COLO. L. REX'. 191 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Averitt]; McCor-

mack, Federalism and Section 1983; Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McCormack]; Theis, supra note
30; Developments, supra note 35; ILL. Comment supra note 36.
8I Developments, supra note 35, at 1338-39.
82 Id. at 1339.
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tion will remain undisturbed because only the legality of the search
and seizure will be relitigated resulting in a monetary award to a
successful plaintiff and not in his release from prison. 83 When only a
single issue is to be relitigated there is less of a strain on judicial
resources than when an entire case is retried. 84 Similarly, the exception will be limited to a single class of cases. 85 Finally, this exception respects the federal interest in maintaining consistent fourth
amendment adjudication. 86 As the interests of comity, efficiency and
respect for state systems of criminal justice are maintained "it becomes increasingly unjustifiable to override section 1983's provision of
a meaningful choice of forum for challenges to the constitutionality of
state action."

87

In cases like McCurry the state prisoner seeking relief under
section 1983 for an alleged search and seizure violation did not have a
choice of forum in the preceeding state criminal action and is further
denied access to habeas corpus review by Stone. Following conviction, the prisoner must seek civil relief in either federal court or in
the state system which has just validated the contested search and
seizure. Congress anticipated in enacting section 1983 that situations
might arise where there would be no state remedy for civil rights
violations and provided potential plaintiffs with the option of suing in
federal court. 88 Choice of forum is the essential element of section
1983. 89 Thus, where the section 1983 plaintiff has freely chosen a
state forum to litigate an issue later presented to federal court, collat-

83 Id. Such an approach would satisfy the Stone Court's concern that an otherwise guilty
party may be released from prison as a result of a search and seizure violation unrelated to the
prisoner's guilt.
84 Id.
85 Judicial interests in economy and efficiency are further respected by the fact that an
exception will only be made for section 1983 cases filed because habeas corpus is denied to
prisoners with search and seizure claims.
86 Developments, supra note 35, at 1339.
Ai exception similar to the one outlined above is also compatible with the Younger Doctrine. The state's interest in carrying out its public policies is given due deference and the
finality of the judgment respects the court's determination of guilt. Yet, the analysis recognizes
that Younger is "not a mandate to prefer state court resolution of issues related to state action
and policies at all costs." Id. at 1342. The continued validity of that argument, however, is
questioned in Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFF. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Gibbons].
87 Developments, supra note 35. at 1342. See Note. Younger Grows Older: Equitable
Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 871, 918 (1975).
88 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 361 (1961): Riminer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d
273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1973).
's Developments, supra note 35, at 1342.
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eral estoppel should bar the second trial. 90 In the unique situation
created by Stone, however, the argument in favor of an exception
becomes stronger. A state prisoner like McCurry may have no alternative but a section 1983 damage suit to redress alleged state violation of his fourth amendment rights. 91
Under the second approach, post-conviction section 1983 suits
are analogized to habeas corpus relief based on the premise that each
shares the important primary function of protecting constitutional
principles. 92 Habeas corpus is an area in which the interests of preclusion and comity are subordinated to the "overriding interest in
federal enforcement of constitutional mandates." 93 Similarly, section
1983 actions should also be given this kind of preferential treatment
at least in the situations where habeas corpus is unavailable to a state
prisoner.

94

Because a section 1983 damage suit seeking to vindicate a state
convict's fourth amendment rights is unconcerned with questions of
guilt or innocence, an exception to the rule of preclusion based on
the above analogy merits consideration in light of the concern expressed by the Stone Court that a guilty party might "go free because
the constable stumbled." 9 5 Due to this fear the Supreme Court has
ruled that convicts claiming search and seizure violations are barred
from habeas corpus relief. 96 A section 1983 damage suit, on the
other hand, does not result in the plaintiff's release from prison. The

90 McKeithen v. Parker, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). See also
Theis, supra note 30, at 868; Developments, supra note 35, at 1342 n.54: McCormack, snpra

note 80, at 276-77.
9' See, e.g., Developments. supra note 35, at 1350-51.

" See Averitt, supra note 80, at 214; MeCormack, supra note 80, at 259-60; ILL. Comment, supra note 36, at 100-02; Comnuert, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of
Federal Rights, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 839 (1964). The cases cited at note 52 supra, suggesting an
exception for section 1983 cases when habeas corpus is unavailable, could be read as implicitly
accepting this rationale. See. e.g., ILL. Comment, supra note 36, at 100 (discussing Moran v.
Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973)).
The analogy between habeas corpus and section 1983 is not universally accepted. See Palna
v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 937-38 (N.D. Il. 1969) (opportunity for federal habeas corpus
rests on the larger interest of the right to personal freedom); Developments, supra note 35, at
1337.
As Averitt states, personal liberty justifies the exception of habeas corpus from the application of res judicata and "itis not clear that the rights secured by section 1983 are of such less
dignity that they cannot conimand similar protection," Averitt, supra note 80, at 214, at least in
the unique situation where habeas corpus is unavailable to a prisoner seeking redress for an
alleged unconstitutional search and seizure.
9' McCormack, supra note 80, at 260.
94 ILL. Comment, supra note 37, at 100-02.
5 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24, 150 N.E. 505, 588 (1926).
96 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95.
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sole concern in a case of this type is the "vindication of principle 9 7
for alleged violations of fourth amendment rights. The federal interest
in assuring correct determination of fourth amendment search and
seizure rights is as strong in a post-conviction section 1983 action as it
is in a normal habeas corpus proceeding. Therefore, collateral estoppel should not be applied to section 1983 suits filed as a result of
Stone in order to protect the federal interest in correct and consistent
enforcement of fourth amendment rights. 98
Although McCurry's section 1983 claim was not collaterally estopped, the court believed it necessary to delay the district court's
rehearing until the appellant had exhausted all state remedies although this issue has been expressly left open by the Supreme
Court. 99 To keep the analogy between section 1983 and habeas corpus as perfect as possible, 100 exhaustion should be required in such
cases.

101

Habeas corpus petitioners are required by statute102 to

exhaust all state remedies before applying to the federal courts for
relief. This -affords the states an opportunity to review and correct any
errors committed at trial. 103 Similarly, respect for state judicial systems, an important concern of the Stone Court, 104 mandates the
same result for section 1983 suits brought because habeas corpus is
unavailable to the state prisoner.
Under the profferred section 1983 analyses, the "societal costs" 15
occasioned by habeas corpus challenges to a state court's determination of a search and seizure's constitutionality are minimized if not
completely removed. 106 The convict will not be released in a successful case, rather, he is compensated by a damage award for police

McCormack, supra note 80, at 259.
98 Id. at 260. This rationale comports with the interest analysis under an exception based on
the limited intrusions on finality and comity principles by collateral estoppel. See note 99 infra.
and accompany ing text.
9' \lcCurr\, 606 F.2d at 799: Judice v, Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1979).
'0o See ILL. Comment, supra note 37, at 103-04 discussing the flaws in the analogy.
"01 See contra, McCormack, supra note 80, at 266.
102 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). The exhaustion requirement of the Younger Doctrine has been
97

given as the reason for a more general exception from res judicata for section 1983 actions than
described in this note. See Theis, supra note 30, at 873.
103 The respect for notions of comity in habeas corpus actions are described as deference to
the state courts rather than a lack of federal power. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402-12 (1963).
104 Stone, 428 U.S. at 492-94 on. 31 & 35 (1976).
A section 1983 damage suit further respects state determinations of guilt by onlv providing
prospective relief. See Woolev v. Maynard, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S.
705 (1977).
05 Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 (1976).
'06 See notes 82-86 & 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
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violations of his constitutional rights. 107 The state court determination of guilt remains undisturbed while federal interests are protected. 108 Without an exception from the rules of preclusion for
cases similar to McCurry, the Stone decision would represent a substantial abandonment of the federal interest in the correct application
of fourth amendment rights. 109
While the Supreme Court has indicated a preference for applying preclusion principles to section 1983 actions, the full import of
the court's preference remains unclear. 110 For example, a number of
courts have suggested that preclusion principles should not apply to
Certainly,
section 1983 actions when habeas corpus is unavailable." u
the important interests fostered by collateral estoppel are outweighed
by section 198 3's promise of a choice of forum and the federal interest
in uniform constitutional adjudication at least in the unique situation

2
created by Stone."1
If Stone was intended to limit the reach of the exclusionary rule,

an exception from preclusion for such section 1983 cases may be ac-

ceptable to the Supreme Court. Beneath the concern expressed about
the effects of the exclusionary rule, however, are other policy considerations of the Burger Court which may foreclose any exception. Justice Brennan has stated that the Stone decision was more concerned

with limiting access to federal forums and with "notions of comity and
federalism than with the exclusionary rule."" 3 Some commentators
have even come to the conclusion that Stone precludes any contest in

federal court of state determinations of fourth amendment rights. 114

McCormack, supra note 80, at 290.
See note 106 supra.
109 But see Gibbons, supra note 86, at 1112-13.
110 The statement in Preiser v. Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 475 (1973), that res judicata would apply
107
108

to civil rights cases has been described as based on "a premise [that is] less than persuasive
[and] . . . is far less than a holding." Theis, supra note 30, at 863. The Court's failure to
directly address this issue has been responsible for the diverse results reached bv the lower
courts. Id. at 865.
... See note 52 supra and accompanying text. Implicit in these dicta statements is the recognition that comitv, finality and efficiency are judicial creations and must be accommodated at
times with more pressing policies. McCormack, supra note 80, at 290; Theis, supra note 30, at
878-79.
12 See notes 82-86 & 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
The results obtained by using section 1983 in this manner may provide experience from
which to judge whether or not the exclusionary rule is the only effective mode of protecting
fourth amendment rights. Clearly, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule in collateral actions are contained while the state prisoner is allowed an opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights in federal court. But see MIapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule is
only means of protecting fourth amendment).
13 Stone, 428 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 See Gibbons, supra note 86, at 1112-13.
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The Stone majority stressed the fact that habeas corpus actions
reviewing search and seizure claims result "in serious intrusions on
values important to our system of government"115 because the prisoner's guilt or innocence is not involved. 116 According to Stme,
such intrusions are unjustifiable where the state conviction may be
overturned. 117 As demonstrated earlier, however, the conviction
remains undisturbed and the prisoner remains incarcerated when section 1983 is the mode of redress for search and seizure claims.118 The
other values identified by the court, however, are the same as those
protected by collateral estoppel and are the same "intrusions" which,
without the prisoner's release, would result in a post-conviction seetion 1983 action. 119 The Court has not addressed this issue yet and
any prediction would be premature. 120 Arguably, the major fear expressed by the Court in Stone is quelled by recourse to section
1983. 121
In a similar vein the Stone majority expressed its unreserved
confidence in the ability of state courts to decide questions of federal
rights. 122 Noting that state courts have the same obligation to uphold the federal constitution as do federal courts, the majority went
on to state that "'[despite differences .. .we are unwilling to assume
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the . .. courts of the several states." 123
As generally agreed, the conditions in southern courts which
prompted the passage of the Act of 1871 no longer exist. 124 Still,
concern about the adequacy of state courts in safeguarding federal
rights are frequently voiced. These concerns have been the subject of
much scholarly debate. 125 At one extreme are the proponents of the
idea that state-federal court parity is a "dangerous myth."1 2 6 Essen115 Stone, 428 U.S. at 491-92 n.31.

116 Id.
117

1I.at 491.

118 See notes 82-86 & 95-98 supra and accompanying text.

119 Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
120 See note 110 supra. The Court's concern with comity and finality is really another way of
expressing its concern over the fact that a guilty party may be released from prison on an issue
totally unrelated to that guilt.
121 See McCormick, supra note 80, at 290.
122 Stone, 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35.

123 Id.
See Theis, supra note 30, at 866-67.
125 See, e.g.. Neuborne. The Myth of Parit,

124

90 HARSv. L. REv. 1105 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Neuborne]; Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:A Federal Judge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 Law and Soc. Order 557 [hereinafter
cited as Aldisert].
6 See Neuborne, supra note 125, at 1105.
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tially, this side contends that institutional differences result in state
court systems which are less capable of constitutional adjudication
than their federal counterparts. 127
At the other end of the spectrum are the defenders of state court
parity. 128 For example, a federal circuit judge has argued that the
media and academia are responsible for the unreasonable disdain of
state courts 129 resulting in an ever growing federal docket. 130 The
preference for federal adjudication is incompatible with the Constitution's system of federalism creating a national court system. 131 Disagreeing with the claims that state courts are institutionally less capable of dealing with federal rights, supporters of state parity point to
the number of cases in which state courts are required to address the
question of federal rights and to the resulting experience gained in
handling those cases. 132
The problem, at least for purposes of the issue discussed in this
note, can be resolved without praising federal courts or condemning
state systems. The key concern is balancing the interests of federalstate comity with the federal interest in constitutional adjudication.
As stated earlier, where the interests in comity are respected, as they
are under the suggested exceptions, the federal interest in constitutional adjudication and the policy considerations underlying section
1983 are both promoted.
James A. Kosch

127 Id.

at 1115-30.

128 See Aldisert, supra note 125.

129 Id. at 559.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 578.
132 Id. at 572.

